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An Empirical Test of an Asymmetric Information Model of Strikes
ABSTRACT
Recent developments in the thoery of strategic bargaining demonstrate how
informational asymmetries can lead to prolonged and costly bargaining. These
models can be applied to contract negotiations between unions and firms
yielding an economic theory of strikes. To date, however, few empirical tests
of these models have been carried out. This paper presents some evidence
supporting this view of strikes. A set of predictions concerning the
incidence and unconditional duration of strikes is derived from a simple
bargaining model where the union is uncertain about the firm's future
profitability. These predictions are then tested on a micro data set of major
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many theories have been advanced over the years to explain the occurrence
of strikes during contract negotiations (for asurvey see Kennan, 1985).
Recently, game-theoretic bargaining models have been developed which offer
potential new insights into why strikes take place (see for exampleCramton,
1982, Hayes, 1984, Sobel and Takahashi, 1982, Tirole and Fudenberg,1984, and
Tracy, 1984). Despite the considerable theoretical work devoted to these
asymmetric information models, no empirical tests of these models have been
published to date. The purpose of this paper is to derive and test some
comparative static results for a simple bargaining model.
The intuition behind these bargaining models is quite simple. The
function of the negotiation process is to reestablish a division of therents
accruing to the bargaining pair consisting of the firm(s) and the union(s).
Despite the bilateral monopoly situation which exists, if both are fully
informed then the bargaining should not lead to a strike. Froman economic
viewpoint, a critical determinant of strike activity is uncertainty. This
uncertainty can be concerning the size of the rents to be divided and/or the
bargaining costs to either party. In the presence of uncertainty, bargaining
serves as a learning process whereby one party may be able to infer the
other's private information by observing his/her actions during the
negotiations. A strike takes place whenever this process continues beyond the
expiration of the current contract. By raising the costs of extending the-2-
bargaining, strikes bring about an eventual settlement.
The following implications will be derived from a simple model in which
the union continues to make wage demands until a settlement is reached.
Increasing the union's uncertainty about the firm's profitability over the
next contract period increases both the probability and the expected duration
of a strike. The larger the average rents to be divided between the firm and
the union, the less likely it is that a strike will occur and the shorter is
its expected duration. Finally, lowering the union's bargaining costs leads
to an increase in overall strike activity.
The paper presents tests of these implications based of a micro data set
of manufacturing contract negotiations. The uncertainty hypothesis is tested
using measures of investor uncertainty over the firm's future profitability
as a proxy for the union's uncertainty. This investor uncertainty is broken
down into a component resulting from economy-wide events and a component
resulting from firm-specific events. The data indicates that while both
measures of uncertainty are positively related to strike activity, the
firm—specific source has the largest and most significant impact.
The effect of business cycle shocks on strike activity is also tested.
The impact of cyclic shocks to the industry as well as to the local labor
market are separately controlled for. The model predicts different effects
for each type of shock. Above average conditions in the industry tend to
raise the rents to the match and therefore should reduce the level of strike
activity. On the other hand, above average conditions in the local labor
market lowers both the level of the rents and the relative bargaining costs
to the union by providing part-time job opportunitiesBoth effects should-3-
tend to increase strike activity. The data confirms that strikes are
counter—cyclic with respect to industry shocks and pro—cyclic with respect to
local shocks.
The hypothesis that larger rents to the bargaining pair discourages
strike activity is further tested by controlling for two additional sources of
rents. These rents can Consist of quasi-rents due to specificity -in the
match and monopoly rents due to market restrictions. Quasi-rents are proxied
by both the industry average job tenure and labor market experience for union
workers. The concentration ratio is used to control for monopoly rents.
Increases in either average tenure or experience reduce strike activety with
the latter effect being highly significant. The concentration effect is
opposite to the prediction and weakly significant.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The second section of the paper
presents background material relevant to the modelling of strikes. The third
section contains a simple N—round bargaining model that illustrates the
implications indicated above. The development of the variables used to test
the model is outlined in the fourth section. The final section discusses the
empirical specification and results.
II. THE CONTRACTING PROBLEM
Unions are assumed in this study to be wealth maximizing. Firms and
unions are engaged -in a long-term association which will involve numerous
contract negotiations. The implication is that the union will not necessarily
attempt to maximize their return from any given contract; instead, they try to—4-
maximize the discounted stream of expected returns from the sequence of future
contracts. In this paper, I assume that is is not in the interest of the
union to bankrupt the firm. This constrains the union's wage demands to a
competitive wage plus a share of the rents accruing to the bargaining pair.1
For simplicity, the bargaining model presented in the next section will not
incorporate the repeated nature of contract negotiations.
Bargaining takes place precisely because of the presence of rents. If no
rents exist, then either both parties accept a competitive return or the firm
goes bankrupt. Consequently, for the contracting problem to be pervasive,
rents must be pervasive. There are two basic sources of these rents. The
first is quasi-rent generated by specificity in the match while the second is
monopoly rent generated by restrictions on output. Quasi-rents exist when the
productivity of the union workers at the firm exceeds their productivity
outside the firm. Similar quasi—rents exist if specialized capital is used by
the firm in its production process.2 A union can attempt to capture a share
of monopoly rents by either organizing into an existing monopoly situation or
trying to form a cartel within a competitive industry.3
Agreeing to a division of these rents may involve an extended period of
bargaining when informational asymmetries exist. However, when both sides are
fully informed as to the size of the rents and the bargaining costs, neither
can gain by delaying the agreement. Consequently, in order to avoid
additional bargaining costs, both sides would agree on a new contract at the
outset of the negotiations. When private information exists, bargaining can
serve as a means of inferring this information. Bargaining continues as long
as the value of the information that is expected to be learned from an—5-
additional round of negotiations outweighs the additional bargaining costs.
Strikes tend to limit the length of negotiations by increasing the costs of
continuing this learning process.
The idea that uncertainty is the central factor behind the dynamics of
bargaining is an implication of the work by Rubenstein (1982). In his paper,
Rubenstein analyzes a bargaining problem in which two individuals must divide
a "pie" of known size. Each individual is fully informed as to the other's
preferences and both prefer consuming the pie now as opposed to later.
However, they must first agree on how the pie is to be divided before they
can eat it. Each individual alternates making suggested splits. Using a
strict form of rationality, Rubenstein demonstrates that the two individuals
will always agree on the first suggested split. No dynamics develop in
the bargaining even though an infinite number of rounds of negotiations are
allowed.
By making each individual fully informed as to the size of the pie and
the other's preferences, Rubenstein eliminated the need for bargaining to
serve as a learning device. Relaxing this assumption of complete information
will create some dynamics and thus allow for strikes to take place.
III. A BARGAINING MODEL WITH STRIKES
The purpose of this section is to analyze a simple bargaining model which
illustrates the implications outlined in the introduction. The firm enters
into the negotiations with full information. The union, though, must
negotiate with incomplete information as to the size of the rents to be-6-
divided. Bargaining can last up to an arbitrary N rounds. At each round, the
union proposes a contract consisting of a wage rate. Production takes place
only after the firm agrees to a contract.4
Let the present value of the firm's profitability over the next contract
peried net of non-labor costs be denoted by P. The value of P is calculated
assuming that no strike takes place, ie that the firm accepts the union's
first contract offer. At the outset of negotiations the firm knows P while
the union believes that P is uniformly distributed over the interval (!,].
Thecosts to each side from delaying the agreement are parameterized by
discount factors 6u'6f The payoff to the firm and the union from agreeing to





If the union's first contract is accepted by the firm, then no strike
takes place. In this case, t =1and no discounting occurs in the payoffs. If
the bargaining continues beyond the first round, then a strike starts and the
payoff to each side from a settlement is discounted to reflect its respective
strike costs. If no agreement can be reached after N rounds, then the
bargaining pair splits up. The union receives the present value of the flow
of competitive wages, R, in the local labor market. The firm receives zero
economic profits in its next best alternative use of its resources. The
union's prior beliefs about P. the discount factors, and the value of R
are assumed to be public information.5—7—
At each round of bargaining, the union chooses awage demand which
maximizes its expected return conditional on the information it has available.
In order to understand how the union infers the firm's private information
during a strike, consider for example what the union learns by observing
whether or not the firm accepts its wage demand in the N_ith round.
Let 'N-i denote the firm's information set at the start of the Nth round
of negotiations. Denote the firm's conditional expectation of the union's Nth
round wage demand by EWN1N-1' In addition, let P(WN,) be the level of
profitability for the firm if it is indifferent between acceptingwN_l or
continuing the strike one round and accepting the next union wage demand. The








The union learns if the firm's profitability -is greater or less than
P(wN_l) by observing if the firm accepts its wage demand wN_. If the firm
rejects the union's wage demand, then the firm's profitability is less than or
equal to P(wN_l). In this case, the union updates its beliefs by placing a
zero probability on P lying in the interval [P(wN_l),P(wN_2)]. As a
consequence, the union enters into the Nth round of negotiations with posterior
beliefs that P is uniformly distributed over the interval [P.
P(wN_l)].
The advantage of working with a bargaining model with a fixed number of
rounds is that its solution can be found by solving recursively from the last—8—
round. Assume that the firm has rejected the union's penultimate wage demand.
The union must now select its best final wage demand given its updated beliefs.
In the Nth round, the firm will accept any wage demand that yields it
nonnegative rents. Consequently, the expected value to the union from making a
wage demand of WN is
(2) Vu(WN) = R
The optimal Nth wage demand maximizes the union's expected payoff.
(3) w =Max{R+1/2((wN_1)
—R],PJ
Define != P+(P-R).Then w >P when P(wN_l) >P.Substituting the




(4) Vu(WN) =Max{R+(1/2) ,P)
(P(wNl) -
Followingthe methodology in Cramton (1982), the form of the final wage
demand and the union's indirect payoff function suggest the following general








Wewill check this conjecture by induction. Assume that this structure holds
for the j+l' through the Nth rounds. We must demonstrate that it also holds—9-
for the jth round.
At the outset of the th round of bargaining, the union believesthat the
firm's profitability is uniformly distributed over the interval
ftP(w_1)].
What is the union's expected payoff from making awage demand of w? If the
firm's profitability level exceeds the corresponding cutofflevel, P(w). then
the firm will accept the wage demand; otherwise, the union receivesthe one
period flow value from its outside opportunities plus the discounted value from
making its optimal wage demand in the next round of negotiations.





Theoptimal wage demand maximizes Vu(w) subject to the constraint on how the






To solve for w, substitute for w÷1 andVu(w+i) from (5) into Vu(w). Using
the constraint, we can writew in terms of P(w) and substitute this into
Vu(w). We can now maximize the unconstrained payoff function with respect to
P(w3). This cutoff point is given by











Finally, substituting for P(w) and w into equation (6) allows us to solve
for the union's 'indirect payoff function.




Checking equations (9) and (10) with the general structure given in






Toclose the model we note that cN =1/2and P0 =P.So long as P(wN_l) >
wecan use equation (5) to describe the union's optimal "concession" function.6
Our interest is in the strike probability and expected strike duration
which is implied by the concession function. Recall that a strike begins if
the firm rejects the union's initial wage demand. The probability of a strike,
then, is given by
-P
(12) Pr =__________








The first three predictions to check are that the probability of a strike
increases with the UrIiOfl'S uncertainty over the firm's profitability, decreases
with larger total expected rents to the bargaining pair, and increases with the
value of the union workers' outside opportunities. Consider, first, the effect
of a mean preserving spread (MPS) in the union's initial distribution of
beliefs concerning the firm's future profitability. Stretching out the
endpoints P and P by an amount has the following effect.
— _________
11 [P—P]
Increasing the union's uncertainty raises the probability of a strike.
Shifting up the entire interval [P,P) by an amount A2 while holding R
constant increases the total expected rents to be divided yet leaves the
uncertainty unchanged. The effect on the strike probability is
aPr 1
(15) —= —(1—k1)— <0
2 2 [P—P]
The larger the total expected rents to be shared, the smaller the strike
probability.
Finally, the effect of raising the value of the union workers' outside
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Improving these opportunities increases the probability of a strike occurring.
The next set of predictions to check concerns the impact of the above list
of factors on the length of the bargaining that occurs. The expected
unconditional strike duration is given by
(17) E(D) = (N—i)
To evaluate this expectation, we need to express the cutoff points, P(w) in
terms of the underlying parameters of the bargaining model. In general we can
write






Substituting for the cutoff terms in (17) and simplifying gives
-N-2
(20) E(D) = EK.(i-k.1)(j) + _(R+ K.(P-R) -P](N-i)
P—P j=1 [P—P)—13—
We can use equation (20) to check the predictions concerning the unconditional
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Finally, the effect of a change in the union's outside opportunities is
(23) 8E(D)= {K(1—k.1)(J)
+[KN1_l)(N_1))
The three prediction concerning the incidence of strikes extend to the





This can be demonstrated using an induction argument.7
In summary, then, this simple N round bargaining model predicts that the
probability of a strike and its expected unconditional duration are positively
related to the degree of uncertainty facing the union and the value of the
union's outside opportunities. On the other hand, both measures of strike
activity are negatively related to the total expected size of the rents to be
shared by the firm and the union. These results incorporateoptimal behavior
by the union and the firm at each round of the bargaining.—14—
IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES USED TO TEST THE MODEL
The micro data set used in this study consists of all major contract
negotiations in manufacturing industries between 1973 and 1977 that were
reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.8 Both contract renegotiations and
scheduled reopenings are included in the data. For each negotiation we know
the firm and the union involved in the negotiations, the industry and region
affected by the contract, whether a strike took place, and if so how long the
strike lasted. Details of the construction of this data are presented in
Tracy (1986).
Viewing contract negotiations as a process of splitting rents presents
difficulties when it comes to empirically testing the model. The predictions
are that strike activity is positively related to the degree of uncertainty
facing the union as well as the union's outside opportunities and inversely
related to the total amount of the rents to be shared. The difficulty is that
we can not directly measure these variables. Instead, we must test the model
by finding proxies for these unobserved parameters of the model.
Consider the problem of measuring the union's uncertainty over the firm's
future profitability. Assume that on average, the greater the uncertainty
that exists in the financial market as to the firm's profitability, the
greater is the union's uncertainty as well. If this positive correlation
exists, then we can use measures of investor uncertainty as our proxy. The
finance literature suggests several methods for measuring this investor
uncertainty. The efficient market hypothesis stresses that security prices
adjust as new information is capitalized in the market. As a result, the—15—
current price of a security is taken as an unbiased in dicator of the firm's
profitability conditional on current information. Any news which changes
investor's expectations will show up as price movements.
A measure of overall investor uncertainty is given by the volatility of
the firm's security returns. Tracy (1986) found that this broad measure of
uncertainty was positively related to both the incidence and the conditional
duration of strikes. While this is viewed as consistent with the asymmetric
information model of strikes, it would be desirable to derive a sharper test
of the model.
In the bargaining model we assumed that the firm knew the exact demand
conditions f or the upcoming contract period. In reality, firms as well as
unions must forecast future demand conditions. There is no a priori reason to
believe that firms are more capable than unions at predicting the influence of
economy wide factors on the firm's profitability. Consequently, it is
unlikely that the union would engage in costly bargaining in an attempt to
learn this type of information from the firm. On the other hand, the firm may
possess superior information concerning firm specific factors affecting its
future performance. The relevant uncertainty facing the union in this model
should be over firm specific information rather than general economy
information.
The volatility of the firm's security return reflects both firm specific
and economy wide sources of uncertainty. The finance theory market model allows
us to separate out each source. The market model expresses a security's
return as a linear function of the market return plus a residual.
R.t= a+ iRMt +:;
where—16—
R.t =returnon the 1th security at time t
RMt =returnon a value weighted portfolio of
securities at time t
The slope coefficient, ,isthe firm's "systematic risk factor" and captures
the security's sensitivity to market influences.
The residual is called the "excess" return and has a zero expectation
conditional on current inforamtion. The excess return nets out much of the
effect of general economy news on the firm's profitability by controlling for
changes in the market return. Schwert (1981, p.125) argues that ".. .usingthe
market model to control for market wide variations in returns to all assets
yields more precise estimates of the firm specific effects on asset returns".
In order to estimate these excess returns, a market model was fitted to a
250 trading day sample for each negotiation in the data for which the firm was
actively traded.9 The firm specific source of uncertainty will be proxied by
the standard deviation of the excess returns. The standard deviation of the
market returns multiplied by the firm's systematic risk factor will proxy
general economy uncertainty. Adjusting for the firm's beta is important since
firms with low betas are more insulated from general economy influences. The
asymmetric information model suggests that the firm specific source of
uncertainty should have the dominant influence on strike activity. This
provides a sharper test of the model than simply looking at an overall
uncertainty measure.
The next element of the bargaining environment to control for is the
average size of the rents to the match between the firm and the union. The—17—
model predicts that higher average rents will reduce the overall level of
strike activity.In section one, I emphasized that these rents can be madeup
of quasi-rents and/or monopoly rents. We need, then, proxies for eachtype bf
rent.
An important source of quasi-rents is firm specific human capital (Becker,
1972). Workers often receive on-the-job training which has its full value
only when used in that firm (or industry). In Williamson's (1975)
terminology, firm specific training imparts an "idiosyncratic" nature to a
task. The end result is that a worker's productivity is raised above its
level in other firms thus creating quasi-rents.
In the absence of direct measures of the extent of on-the-jobtraining,
the most natural proxy variable is the average job tenure of union workers in
that industry. The 1979 May Current Population Survey (CPS) contains botha
union coverage and job a tenure question. All union workers answering the
tenure question were sorted by two-digit industry and the industryaverage
tenure was calculated. A problem with this measure was that several industry
averages were based on very small samples of workers. This may introduce
serious measurement error into this variable.10
An alternative proxy overcomes this problem of small sample size but is a
less direct measure of specific training. Union workers were pooled from four
years of May CPS's (1973-1976) and their potential work experience was
calculated. This provided a large sample of workers in each industry to use
to obtain industry average experience estimates. As a comparison, the same
measure of experience was calculated from the May 1979 CPS. All three
measures will be tested in the next section. The prediction is that they will—18--
be inversely related to strike incidence and unconditional strike durations.
The extent of monopoly rents depends in part on the industry structure
that the firm operates in. A simple characterization of this industry
structure is given by the concentration ratio. Specifically, the measure
used is the percent of the total sales in a four—digit industry classification
that were accounted for by the four largest firms. To the extent that higher
levels of measured concentration lead to a greater ability to generate
monopoly rents, then the model predicts that strike activity will be inversely
related to the concentration ratio.
An additional factor which potentially could affect the rents to be shared
by a bargaining pair is the cyclic conditions facing the industry at the time
of the negotiations. When industry demand conditions are above average, rents
may tend to be larger than usual. This implies that, others things constant,
it is costly for the bargaining pair to be involved in a strike at this time.
These cyclic demand shocks will be measured using residuals from an
industry employment trend regression. These trend regressions were estimated
using quarterly three-digit employment data for the period 1970-1981. A
linear time trend with quarterly dummy variables and an autoregressive error
term was fit for each three—digit industry in the negotiation sample. To
avoid any potential feedback between the actual amount of strike activity in a
quarter and the residual, forecasted residuals are used in the analysis.
The final element of the model to proxy for are the union's outside
opportunities. During the course of a strike, union members may be obtain
part-time jobs which help to offset their strike costs. The likelihood of
finding temporary employment will be affected by the general labor market—19—
conditions in the locality. Following the apporach used to measure the cyclic
shocks to the industry, cyclic conditions in the local labor market will be
proxied by forecasted residuals from local employment trend regressions.
This concludes the discussion of the proxy variables used to test the
predictions from the asymmetric information model of strikes. Several
additional variables will also be included in the analysis to control for
other factors which may affect the bargaining environment. A discussion of
the motivation for and construction of these variables -is given in Tracy
(1986).
V. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND RESULTS
One of the implications of the model outlined in section three is that any
variable which increases the likelihood of a strike should also increase the
unconditional strike duration. The choice of an econometric specification
should be flexible enough to allow the data to reject this association. An
example of a specification which violates this condition is the lob-it model.
Consequently, I will separately model the probability of a strike and the
conditional duration. This will allow me to calculate the marginal effect of
a variable on the likelihood of a strike, the conditional duration, and the
unconditional duration. Prior to estimation the data was standardized by
subtracting from each variable its sample mean and dividing by its sample
standard deviation.
The probability of a strike is assumed to be given by a logistic function.
(26) Pr = 1
1+EXP(-X )-20-




Theconditional strike durations are analyzed using a proportional hazard
function.
(28) A(t;X) =X7(At)'1EXP(X)
The conditional settlement probability decreases, remains constant, or increases
during the course of a strike as y <1,y =1,y >1.In addition, the industry
and local employment residuals are allowed to vary if the strike enters a new
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The sample means and standard deviations of the variables used in the
analysis are presented in table 1. The impact of variables on the probability
and duration of a strike are presented in table 2 and table 3•11 Consider first—21—
the role of uncertainty in bargaining. As in Tracy (1986), overall
variability in the security returns has a significant and positive effect on
strike incidence. A one standard deviation increase in this broadmeasure of
uncertainty leads to nearly a three percent increase in the likelihood of a
strike. From table 3 we see that this same increase inuncertainty increases
the conditional strike duration by over eight days and the unconditional
duration by two and a half days.
The second specification in each table presents the results from
disaggregating this broad uncertainty measure into its two basic components.
The data clearly indicates that uncertainty over firm specific information is
more important than uncertainty over general economy information in
determining strike activity. While both types of uncertainty raise the
likelihood of a strike, the marginal effect arising from variability in the
firm's excess returns is more than twice the magnitude and muchmore precisely
measured than the marginal effect from variability in the adjusted market
returns. Similarly, only increases in the firm specific uncertainty measure
leads to longer conditional and unconditional strike durations. Aone
standard deviation increased in the volatility of the excess returns results
in an eight day increase in the conditional durations and over a twoday
increase in the unconditional duration.
The key assumption of the asymmetric information model of strikes outlined
earlier is that the firm has private information concerning its future
profitability. The data clearly establishes the connection between volatility
in the firm's security price and strike activity. These price movements
reflect the markets reaction to news pertaining to the firm's performance.—22—
The connection between these uncertainty measures and the model relies on some
of this news being known by the firm in advance of its disclosure. This
assumption is more reasonable for the types of firm specific information which
are captured by the excess returns. Consequently, the finding that
variability in the excess returns is the key uncertainty measure lends
additional support to this learning model of bargaining and strikes.
Turn now to the variables used to test for the effect of changes in the
magnitude of the rents on the bargaining process. Consider first the various
measures for the amount of firm-specific human capital in the industry. Table
2 and table 3 report only the results from using the experience measure
obtained from the pooled sample of union workers. This reflects a concern
with the possibility of serious measurement error in the job tenure and
experience measures calculated from the May 1979 CPS data. A one standard
deviation increase in the pooled experience measure is associated with an
eight percent drop in the strike probability. However, experience had no
significant effect on the conditional strike duration.
As a comparison, the exact same measure of experience calculated from the
1979 data resulted in a logistic coefficient of —0.05971 with a t—statistic of
—0.71. Similarly, the logistic coefficient for the job tenure measure was
—0.11316 with a t—statistic of -1.34. The potential measurement error problem
is evidenced by the dramatic difference in results between the pooled and
nonpooled experience measures. These results also indicate that given the
measurement error problems that may exist, job tenure is the superior measure.
The marginal effect and significance level for tenure is nearly double the
corresponding nonpooled experience figures. This is consistent with the—23—
notionthat what creates quasi-rents is firm—specific not general human
capital. Finally, a likelihood ratio test was carried out using the pooled
data to check the restriction that the correct specification was experience
rather than age and education entered separately. The test statistic was
-2lnX =0.696implying that the data does not reject that experience is the
correct variable to use.
The data does not support the hypothesis that higher degrees of industry
concentration are associated with lower strike incidences. On the contrary, a
one standard deviation increase in the concentration ratio is associated with
a 1.7 percent increase in the probability of a strike. This marginal effect
is weakly significant. There is no corresponding connection between the level
of industry concentration and conditional strike durations. Consequently,
while the unconditional marginal effect is positive, it is not significant.
Cyclic movements in the rents to the bargaining pair also seem to affect
strike activity in a manner consistent with the model. A five percent
increase in forecasted industry employment is associated with nearly a two
percent drop in the likelihood of a strike. Similar to the experience
measure, the industry employment residual does not significantly decrease the
conditional strike duration. Consequently, while the unconditional marginal
effect is negative as predicted it is not measured very precisely.
The last variable to check which relates to the bargaining model -is the
local employment residual. The model suggests that improvements in local
labor market conditions would have the opposite effect on strike activity as
compared to improvements in industry labor market conditions. The data
supports this prediction. A 4 percent increase in local forecasted employment—24—
is associated with slightly over a 5 percent increase in the probability of a
strike. The t—statistic associated with this marginal effect is 4.80 for the
second specification. Unlike the industry employment residual, the local
employment residual does significantly affect the conditional duration of a
strike. The same 4 percent increase in forecasted employment is associated
with a dramatic two week reduction in the conditional duration. This implies
that the effect of local labor market conditions on the incidence of strikes
is opposite to its effect on the conditional durations.
Recall that the model has the property that the marginal effects of a
variable on the incidence and the unconditional durations should be the same.
In the case of the local employment residual, we see that despite the large
drop in conditional durations, the point estimate for the unconditional
marginal effect is positive although not significantly different from zero.
It would be of interest to see if other data sets on strikes yield similar
findings for measures of local employment conditions.
Turn now to the other variables included in the analysis. The capital
intensity of the production technology has some impact on the bargaining
environment. A one standard deviation increase in the capital/labor ratio
increases the strike probability by around two percent and increases the
conditional duration by slightly over ten days. Neither effect, though, is
measured with much precision. Changes in the firm's inventory position prior
to the negotiations does not affect the level of strike activity. Firm size
as measured by the net plant and equipment is an important aspect to the
negotiations. Larger firms were found to have lower incidences of strikes and
shorter conditional durations with the second effect being significant. These—25-
two effects combined to produce a negative and significant scale effect on the
unconditional duration. Despite the role played by the industry unionization
rate in union wage differential studies, this variable did not affect the
level of strike activity. Finally, higher employment growth rates for the
industry or the locality tend to raise the likelihood of a strike slightly and
shorten the conditional durations.
The results presented in table 2 and table 3 are estimated using both
interindustry as well as intraindustry variation in the data. A question of
interest is whether the key findings of the study hold principally across
industries but not necessarily within industries. The answer to this issue
can be found by reestimating the model exploiting only within industry
variation in the data. To do this, seventeen industry fixed effects were
included in the logistic model. The food, textile, and apparel industries
comprised the left out group. The latter two experienced no strikes which
implied that no separate fixed effect could be estimated for them.
The "within" logistic coefficients and their implied marginal effects are
given in table 4. Looking within industries the firm specific source of
uncertainty is still the key uncertainty measure affecting strikes. While its
marginal effect is reduced from 2.5 percent to 1.8 percent, this effect
remains larger and more significant than the corresponding effect from the
economy wide measure of uncertainty. No estimate for labor force experience
is possible since it was measured only at the two-digit industry level. The
two employment residuals retain their opposite and significant effects on
strike activity. Finally, the industry concentration marginal effect is
higher and more significant when based solely on within industry variation.—26—
In summary, the aim of this study was to explore and test the comparative
static results from a simple asymmetric information model of negotiations and
strikes. The central idea of the model was that bargaining may serve as a
means whereby the union can infer information about the firm's future
profitability that is privately known by the firm. An implication was that
increases in the union's uncertainty over the firm's profitabiltiy would
increase the incidence and unconditional duration of strikes. Two distinct
measures of profit uncertainty were generated. The data indicated that not
only were both measures directly related to strike activity, but that the firm
specific measure was the key source of uncertainty. This finding is important
since the firm specific uncertainty measure seems to be more closely tied to
the information asymmetry built into the model. As a whole, the data seemes
consistent with the predicitioris of the simple bargaining model outlined in
this paper. Clearly, additional tests should be developed for this class of
bargaining models and checked against the data.—27—
FOOTNOTES
1.A separate issue is how the union prevents its older members from
behaving as income vs wealth maximizers. Pension funds and seniority rulesmay
serve help to overcome this problem by extending the horizon of older members.
2.See Klein, Crawford and Aichian (1979) for a discussion of the
appropriab-ility of these quasi-rents.
3.See McDonald and Robinson (1985) for a model of a union generatingmonopoly
rents in a competitive industry.
4. Sobel and Takahash-i (1982) give a general discussion of this type of model.
See also the work by Cramton (1982).
5.I also assume the R <P;that is, with complete information is would
always be efficient for the firm and the union to sign a contract.
6. 1 am currently working on deriving the concession function and itscomparative
* statisticsfor the case where P(WN...l) <P.In this case, the union sets WN =
whichguarantees that the firm will accept the contract.
7.Details of this induction argument are available upon request.
8.Major contracts are those which cover at least 1,000 workers.
9.Speculation as to the outcome of the bargaining will begin to occur as the
contract expiration date approaches. This speculation will induce price
movements of its own that do not reflect the unions uncertainty about the
firmts future demand conditions. To avoid picking up these price movements in
the uncertainty measure, the sample period used to estimate the market model
ended six months prior to the contract expiration date.
10. A total of eight industries had less than thirty observations on which to—28—
calculate the industry average tenure. For example, the tobacco industry had
one observation, the lumber industry three observations, and the textile
industry five observations.
11. Table 2 also reports "pseudo" R2 statistics for each specification. This
R2 is calculated as follows
21—(L /LQ)21'N
"PSEUDO"R
where L =maximizedvalue of the unrestricted likelihood function
L =maximizedvalue of the likelihood function restricted to
an intercept term
N =samplesize.
This measure was proposed by Cragg and Uhier (1970).—29-
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UNCONDITIONAL SAMPLE MEANS ANDSTANDARD DEVIATIONS
Standard
Variable Mean DeviationTable 2















—0.74876 —0.07983 -0.75729 -0.08048































































2 0.126 Pseudo R
N =1,319.Note: t—statistics in parentheses.Table 3


















































































































































































—956. 713 —956. 629
t—statistics inparentheses.Variable
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Net Plant and Equipment
Union Coverage Rate
Industry Employment
Growth Rate
State Employment
Growth Rate
Intercept
Log Likelihood
Pseudo R2
0.09484
(0.88)
0.17499
(1.96)
—3. 14056
(-6.65)
—491. 624
0.167